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STUDY OF DERADICALIZATION AND DISENGAGEMENT OF FORMER TERRORISM CONVICTS AS AN EFFORT TO PREVENT TERRORISM FOR NATIONAL RESILIENCE

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Abstract: Terrorism is an issue of particular concern worldwide because of its global threat. The Indonesian government realizes that terrorism is an extraordinary event that requires special handling, hence, the appropriate countermeasure is needed. One of the ways to achieve it is by deradicalization and disengagement of former convicts in terrorism cases. This article aims to determine the role of deradicalization and disengagement methods for ex-convicts in terrorism cases as a strategy for dealing with criminal acts of terrorism in Indonesia. The research method used in this study was literature research, which was then analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Deradicalization programs require many approaches which depend on the individual's characteristics in understanding the process of radicalization that occurs and is experienced by certain individuals or groups. So that by understanding the interpretation of the deradicalization polemic that is occurring, a new formulation is needed for the treatment of convict convicts. Effective methods of deradicalization and disengagement rehabilitation, continuous testing, periodic assessment, and strict supervision, carried out by the state in a comprehensive manner, can undoubtedly be a form of great support, specifically, for ex-convicts to not return and join their radical groups and leave violent ways.

Keywords: Deradicalization, Disengagement, Terrorism, Prisoners

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is organized crime which is a global threat that has existed since the end of the cold war. Indonesia itself has experienced various forms of terrorism at least since the bombing on the island of Bali in 2002 which killed hundreds of people including foreign tourists (WNA) who were enjoying their vacation. This event became known as the 2002 Bali Bombings.

Japan's Foreign Ministry in early September 2021 urged its citizens in 6 countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, to stay away from religious facilities and potential crowds, as the ministry said it had obtained information regarding possible attacks and increased risks such as suicide bombings. Quoted from the *Associated Press* (AP) News Agency, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the warning through its Embassies in six Southeast Asian countries, namely Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Myanmar, to then be conveyed to Japanese citizens in these countries ((APNews 2021).

Responding to the warning from the Japanese Government, the Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency (hereinafter referred to as BNPT) Komjen Boy Rafli Anwar said that he understood the concerns of the Japanese Government, but please note that the Government of Indonesia has so far continued to carry out terror prevention, terrorism prevention, law enforcement and international cooperation in accordance with the

mandate of the Law on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism (("BNPT Soal Jepang Peringatkan Teror: 320 Lebih Ditangkap" 2021). Head of BNPT Komjen Boy Rafli Amar stated "the annual report on the Global Terrorism Index last year ranked Indonesia 37th, or means medium affected by terrorism" Jakarta, Monday (22/3). Which means Indonesia is safer than neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and Burma.

This is in accordance with the findings of a survey conducted by BNPT in collaboration with Alvara Research and the Nazaruddin Umar Foundation which found the potential for radicalization in Indonesia decreased by 55.2% since 2017. In 2019 it became 38.4%, which means it is in the low category and becomes the very low category, in 2020 with the potential trend of radicalism being only 14%, this was explained by Boy Rafli. Meanwhile, based on BNPTRI's twitter media, in 2022 Indonesia experienced a decrease in the Radicalism Potential Index by 2.2% from 12.2% in 2020 to 10%. This shows that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the trend of potential radicalism tends to decrease.

After the 2002 Bali bombings, the Indonesian government realized that terrorism is an extraordinary event that requires special handling. These three Bali bombing events are acts of terrorism condemned by the international community and of course appropriate countermeasures are needed. One form of the Indonesian Government's response is to issue a Government Regulation in Lieu

of Law No. 1 of 2002 concerning the Eradication of *Criminal Acts of Terrorism (PERPPU 1/*2002), because the 2002 Bali Bombing event is an extraordinary event that requires a legal umbrella that can be issued by the President, in the event of emergency and force majeure. PERPPU 1/2002 is the first legal basis or foothold in countering terrorism in Indonesia, where then the legal basis undergoes various developments and changes adapted to the increasingly complex and dynamic issue of terrorism itself. Even so, looking at the data that the author will present below, the persistence of recidivism and the spread of radical ideas in cyberspace show the need for increased vigilance and prevention efforts, both in policy and through programs to foster prisoners of terrorism crimes that are carried out.

According to BNPT records in 2016, there were at least 15% of 600 terrorism convicts (hereinafter referred to as prisoners) who had been released but returned to become terrorists with increased qualifications (Balitbang 2016). Meanwhile, according to data released by the *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict* (IPAC) on September 4, 2020, there were 94 recidivists of terrorism cases from 825 prisoners (recidivism rates ranged from 10-11%) (Setyawan, 2021(Setyawan 2021). In addition, quoting Kompas.id, according to BNPT data, there are still 5-7% of former prisoners who are still included in the red category classification (Rahayu 2022). According to Dyah Ayu Kartika, IPAC researcher in Kompas.com, a prisoner is classified by the densus into red, yellow and green categories. The red category is defined as prisoners who are still extreme, radical, and considered uncooperative, while the green category is defined as prisoners who have turned around and are cooperative and usually have attracted their extremism by pledging allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia (Kartika 2022).

One of the recent cases of terrorism attacks committed by Agus Sujatno or Agus Muslim at the Astanaanyar Sector Police, Bandung City, and West Java on December 8, 2022 is one example of the importance of early detection of potential prisoner recidivism. Agus, who was previously involved in the Cicendo bomb case, Bandung city in 2017, had served a four-year sentence until his release in 2021. However, Agus was released with red status because he was not willing to participate in the deradicalization program held in the prison.

Looking back at the suicide bombing case at the Astanaanyar Police Headquarters, there are several facts that can be observed. that is:

1. That according to Inspector General Ibnu Suhendra, Deputy for Enforcement and Capacity Building of BNPT, Agus Sujatno aka Agus Muslim is free from his criminal term in 2021 with the status or inclusion of the category of ex-red prisoner (Maulud 2022). It was later discovered that after being released after serving a criminal period, Agus Sujatno still had contacts and was still affiliated with organizations identified with terrorism such as Jamaah Ansharut, Daulah Jawa Barat or Jamaah Ansharut Daulah Bandung (Rosa 2022).

This reflects that the supervision carried out by the state in this case BNPT on ex-prisoners, including those in the red category, is far from maximum.

2. That on the vehicle driven by Agus Sujatno when he visited the Astanaanyar Police Chief, namely a Suzuki Shogun motorcycle with license plate AD 5055 NS, there was writing on a piece of white paper attached to the motorcycle which read:

"THE CRIMINAL CODE OF SHIRK/INFIDEL LAW, FIGHT THE ENFORCERS OF SATANIC LAW, Qs 9:29"

Although the ownership of the motorbike was registered not in the name of Agus Sujatno, the writing on the paper attached to the motorbike could not be ignored so that it was confiscated by investigators in order to reveal the suicide bombing case, besides that the writing was used as a clue that was not impossible to be used to describe Agus Sujatno's perspective as an ex-prisoner, That is to reject the legitimate government so that the laws made by the country and the officers who enforce them, should be fought.

Not only that, several acts of terrorism that occurred in Indonesia were also carried out by former prisoners such as Yahya Cahdiyat in the case of the pot bomb in Bandung, or the terrorist act of throwing Molotov cocktails in front of the Ecumenical church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, carried out by Juhanda in 2016. Juhanda is a former Puspitek Serpong bomber who belonged to the Pepy Vernando group, who later after his release joined the East Kalimantan JAD group and had links with the Anshori group in East Java. In addition to the examples above, there are also other cases such as the attack on the Cikokol police station, Tanggerang in 2016 by prisoner Sultan Aziansyah (BBC, 2016) (BBC 2016) (Tempo.co, 2020). (Tempo.co 2020).

From these case examples, it can be seen the vulnerability of recurrence of acts of terrorism committed by former prisoners and the urgent need for effective policies and programs in detecting potential recidivism for prisoners, deradicalization and disengagement efforts for former prisoners, besides that no less important is the evaluation and supervision of former prisoners who have been released back into society. However, as stated in Kompas.id, deradicalization of suspects, defendants, prisoners and former terrorism convicts cannot be done on voluntary grounds. Therefore, it can also be said, the loosening of provisions in participating in the deradicalization program can increase the potential for former terrorism convicts to return to their actions after being released from their sentences.

METHOD

Based on the description mentioned previously in the introduction, the main purpose of this article is to explore deradicalization and disengagement models or methods for terrorism prisoners in preventing terrorism in Indonesia. The research method used in this study is

descriptive methods using literature and previous studies or research. Literature and previous studies or research sought with various information and data sourced from books, scientific journals, magazines, and newspapers and other documents (Muhtadi and Rasid 2022). In this study, data collection and analysis were carried out through the review of documents from various sources such as books, laws, fatwas and articles with online searches related to the problem of deradicalization and disengagement of former terrorism prisoners which were then analyzed using qualitative content analysis.

RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS
Terrorism and radicalization

There are many definitions in relation to the definition of terrorism. The word 'terror' as the root of the word terrorism, which comes from the Latin *terrere* which means having the ability to make someone tremble or cringe with fear. Some experts define the term terrorism based on its purpose which is a specific form of political violence that involves the use of threats and violence against citizens, public means, aimed at bringing or stopping legitimate political power (Asrori 2019) Terrorism is described not as a primary goal, but as a means of demonstrating a threat and an effective way to achieve an end by committing violence against an opponent.

The term terrorism can be found in Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Terrorism is defined as acts that use violence or threats that create an atmosphere of widespread terror or fear, that can cause mass casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategically vital objects, the environment, public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political or security disturbance motives. Based on this definition, we can see the threat of acts of terrorism that can cause damage and chaos as well as security disturbances that not only affect the country concerned but also globally.

The fight against terrorism cannot be separated from the problem of ideology and radicalism. Ideology can be interpreted as the science of ideas or teachings about basic understanding, this ideology is infiltrated and synchronized with religion and postulates that strengthen the emphasis on the meaning of jihad, thus making the justification for radicalism (Jafar, Sudirman, and Rifawan 2019). Because radicalism is understood as a process, a person's radical views and attitudes can almost always be said to always appear in the form of ideologies and belief system values obtained by the individual through the group, movement or social organization that introduced it (Asrori 2019) Che Nordin argues that the root of terrorism is a radical attitude driven by extreme views and behaviors in demanding change (Nordin and Naim 2017)

Four critical phases in which transformation into radicalization takes place within members and activists of radical organizations: (1) *Pre-radicalization,* this is the stage in which individual political views are relatively

moderate in relation to the struggle to become an independent state; (2) *Self-identification:* this stage in which individuals actively analyze to engage in the struggle for independence through "cognitive opening up" arising from factors such as personal, socio-economic or political crises; (3) *Indocrination,* this phase is an intensification phase in which the person concerned begins to get acquainted with ideas about independence and how to fight for it. It is intensively and will probably be part of the ideals of pro-independence organizations. Contract and socialization with charismatic "spiritual leaders" and small groups of individuals who share similar beliefs; (4) *Martyrdom or martyrdom*, in which the individual defines himself as *a martyr,* or ultimately feels chosen as a martyr who is ready to kill himself for the sake of the ideology he believes. From this presentation, it can be seen that radicalization does not occur in a short span of time because radicalization is a psychological change.

According to Kruglanski (2014) radicalization implies a movement that aims to support or implement a radical behavior that can be contributed by various factors such as personality, culture, or other situational variables ((Kruglanski et al. 2014). In his journal also stated various kinds of goals to be achieved through an act of terrorism such as dignity and dignity, revenge, religion, loyalty to the leader, reward of the end world or even feminism, but behind all these factors there is a motivating force called a search for self-meaning, to become someone meaningful, to get an award. This search for meaning or self-meaningfulness can then be triggered by one of three factors, such as:

1. Loss of meaning – which can manifest in both individual and social forms. Such as Palestinian women who voluntarily carry out suicide bombings because of the suffering they experience due to the stigma received in their lives (due to infertility, divorce, or infidelity); or the young man who blew himself up at an Israeli *check point* turned out to have been diagnosed with HIV AIDS. Or in social forms such as humiliation that humiliates a group by trampling on their sacred values, which are then exploited by Al Qaeda terrorist propagandists and their networks.

2. Avoiding loss of meaning, the threat of potential loss of meaning can motivate individuals to take an action aimed at avoiding the occurrence of such risks. An example depicted is the Japanese Kamikaze warriors of the second world war. Letters they send to their loved ones show that they do not want to die or expect reward but that they cannot bear the shame of their own and family honor if they do not carry out their missions.

3. The potential for meaningful benefits, for example by carrying out suicide bombings, his name will go down in history, gaining the status of a hero or martyr in the eyes of the group.

4. Ideology and social ties - goal triggers alone are not enough to give rise to an action or behavior. Therefore it is important to identify a meaning in that goal. Generally this is done by justifying an ideology of terrorism that instructs the individual on what they must do to obtain that meaning.

Figure 1 is a diagram illustrating the schema of the radicalization meaning-seeking model.

Figure 1
Significance-seeking model of radicalization
Source: (Kruglanski et al. 2014)

Departing from Kruglanski's theory, it can be said that efforts in the approach to the deradicalization model of prisoners cannot be generalized and the rehabilitation or coaching process carried out needs to get a clear understanding of what drives the individual concerned to commit the act of terrorism (Kruglanski et al. 2009).

Another important effort that continues and must be explored is deradicalization methods and models that can be done so that the individual leaves the extremist group, gives up the radicalism espoused and stops using violent means. This is particularly concerned with concerns in many countries to determine whether prisoners can be rehabilitated and fostered during their sentences, so that they are safe to be released back into society. Especially looking at the vulnerability of recidivism and the possibility of prisoners experiencing a learning and socialization process in prisons that can actually strengthen and sharpen acts of terrorism that can be carried out. Looking at this perspective, it can be seen the importance of effective rehabilitation and coaching programs that are expected to reduce if not eradicate the emergence of recidivists of former prisoners. To be able to do this, it is necessary to know and understand what factors encourage or motivate an individual to carry out an act of terrorism? Why and how can a person embrace such a radical ideology to the point where he is capable of violence, sacrificing his own life and putting aside the importance of the value of the lives and lives of others?

Understanding Deradicalisation

Giving up radicalism and stopping the violent means of terrorism is of particular concern in many countries for guidance and rehabilitation during sentences. So that the prisoners will be safe to be released back into the community. One way that can be done is deradicalization.

Deradicalization, which promotes restoration justice, is an attempt to eliminate violent ideologies from the radical ideas of an individual through a structured program, and through a broad concept of terrorist rehabilitation that

includes community engagement initiatives and reforms in national legislation that aim to serve as a strategic and long-term model of *counterterrorism* (Kruglanski et al. 2014). Deradication is one of the counter-terrorism strategies. Deradicalization is understood as part of a way of changing the ideology of terrorist groups. The changes that occur are not only individuals who are free from acts of violence, but also break away from the radical groups that have sheltered them so far (Indrawan and Aji 2019).

For example, the context of Islamic radicalization involves the adoption of a belief (religion), that in creating an Islamic state government, Muslims must not only obey Salafist or a very conservative Islamic ideology, but must also engage in jihad, which is defined as a struggle against enemies of Islam, including non-Muslim states and current Muslim state power holders who replace Allah's rule by their own power. From here, Islamic deradicalization is defined as, the process of rejection of this creed, especially its belief in the permissibility of using violence against civilians, the exclusion of Muslims who do not adhere to radical views (*takfir*), and opposition to democracy and the concept of civil society freedom, as understood in today's democratic society (Horgan 2008)

However, there is a more complicated process in dealing with those who commit acts of terror because of a false and destructive extreme understanding or interpretation of Islam. In carrying out its acts of terror, radical

Islam is motivated by a deeply rooted religious ideology and religious obligation, so asking them to abandon their ideology is not easy. What can be done in the deradicalization process in this case is to carry out a deradicalization process facilitated by Islamic religious leaders that allows extremists to leave this radical and extremist side without having to leave their faith (Horgan 2008).

According to Jessica Stern (2010) her experience while involved in deradicalization efforts against prisoners, ideology is often not the only important motivating factor that motivates an individual to commit acts of terrorism. For this reason, the deradicalization rehabilitation process needs to pay attention to and take advantage of the variations and movements of these motivations. According to his journal, the majority of young participants in the program had little education and limited Islamic knowledge. Most are unemployed, or employed but with low salaries. Group dynamics become one of the important factors in the movement of terrorism that attracts them through social connections, music, or lifestyle and only later fully understand the goals and ideology of groups that use violence. On the other hand, the group is an important part of their identity and is often the only community they belong to. Thus in these cases, the program needs to provide social support for them. In addition, there are also economic reasons, where countries with high unemployment rates have vulnerability to the recruitment process of

terrorism members. In this case, an effective model of strategy can be training. workshops or counseling in terms of work and career, financial assistance is often also provided to ex-prisoners and families in certain countries, in accordance with applicable regulations or policies and agreements (Stern 2010)

According to Sutabdi (2015) to measure the success of the rehabilitation and deradicalization process, several factors are determined, namely: (1) The transformation process is influenced by 7 factors, including background, interaction, questions, crises, meetings, commitments and consequences; (2) Identify behavioral changes that occur through the process of disengagement from changing roles from active to passive, jihad to da'wah, and moving from supporting acts of terror to da'wah and passive; (3) Successful rehabilitation involves communities in reintegration; (4) Direct deradicalization efforts to change their ideology will face major challenges from the subjects of deradicalization because humans will be defensive when directly clashed with opposing opinions or views (Sukabdi 2015).

Some of the methods applied in deradicalization are providing education, both religious education and other knowledge, especially Pancasila and citizenship education which opens the horizons of thinking of former terrorism prisoners, as well as providing independence. But rehabilitation methods that are still carried out in Indonesia are still considered ineffective. This was mentioned by one of the former

prisoners Hendro Fernando, or Abu Jasyi who was sentenced to 6 years and 2 months for terrorism crimes for supplying firearms, recruiting and dispatching hundreds of Indonesian citizens to Syria to join the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) affiliated to ISIS in 2014 and played a role in MIT funding. According to Hendro, not all deradicalization programs he received were considered right on target by stating:

"When I was detained in Gunung Sindur prison, for example. The Penitentiary immediately came up with the ideology of Pancasila, even though at that time I was still very closed, my ideology was still strong and radical, finally I resisted".

This is because the deradicalization method applied is more with a "patronizing" style mechanism. This can be reduced and more focused on a persuasive approach style that prioritizes extracting information on the mindset of prisoners or ex-prisoners. The hope with this mechanism is of course to gain a deep understanding of the real motivation of the prisoner. In addition, it may be possible to know the cause of the unacceptability of the paradigm of non-radical Indonesian nationalism in their minds so that an appropriate formulation of a rehabilitation model for both deradicalization and disengagement can be made towards these prisoners or ex-prisoners.

The failure of the deradicalization program found the prisoners involved in returning to active terrorism networks after leaving prison. An example of a suicide bombing case at the Bandung

Police Station occurred on Wednesday, December 7, 2022. The perpetrator Agus Sujatno is a former terrorism convict who was sentenced to four years in 2017 for the bombing in Cicendo Bandung. National Police Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo also argued that the deradicalization process requires different techniques and tactics. Because the person concerned is still difficult to talk to and tends to avoid (Oesman 2022).

Of course, the implementation is not as easy as writing in theory, especially when looking at the perspective of the victim. But without a change, it will be more difficult to suppress napiter recidivism.

One example that is often mentioned in research literature in connection with deradicalization programs as a country that is able to reduce the recidivism rate of prisoners with its deradicalization program is the Saudi Arabian government which focuses on *behavior modification* over ideological change (Horgan 2008). Jessica Stern said, this program provides psychological counseling, entrepreneurial training, art therapy, sports activities and religious re-education. It also said freed former Guantanamo prisoners were facilitated by being given houses, cars, money for marriage, and, according to the journal, assistance to find wives, if needed. In addition, they also receive assistance in career placement for both the former prisoner and his family, and there are programs that continue to be provided

after release and extensive supervision (Stern 2010).

However, according to Horgan, even with the strategy that has been carried out, there are still issues that question whether reform extremists are really experiencing the expected changes (deradicalized), or whether these changes are only triggered by incentives received and offered (only *disengaged*)? This is mainly due to the derdicalization process which still does not have an accurate way to measure the success of the program carried out. So the next question that is then raised is, should the program model implemented focus on the process of deradicalization of former prisoners or disengangements, which until now has looked more realistic? (Horgan 2008)

This radicalization polemic is certainly a challenge for government officials to overcome it. One of the ways that the government has implemented *counterterrorism* to the growing problem of radicalization is by implementing deradicalization programs. It should be understood that deradicalization programs are a challenge to find the best program as a method, applied with different methods from one country to another in tackling growing radicalism. Many approaches are needed in the deradication process according to their characteristics in understanding the radicalization process experienced by certain individuals or groups (Walanda 2020) So by understanding the interpretation of the deradicalization polemic that occurs, it can be seen that the

deradicalization process that is currently occurring is not running optimally. Therefore, an objective understanding is needed in interpreting the deradicalization process that occurs, so that the deradicalization program can run effectively and efficiently (Munandar, Syauqillah, and Priyanto 2017).

Understanding Disengagement

Deradicalization emphasizes two main aspects, including (1) disengagement, which aims to encourage radical groups to reassess themselves through social change, so that they abandon the radical ideas they believe in; and (2) deideologization is the elimination of religious ideology not to be used as an ideology in politics but to bring a message of peace for all ((Shodiq 2018). Some literature distinguishes between disengagement and deradicalization. Disengagement condition is the process when one or a group of terror perpetrators no longer commit violence and/or leave the terrorist network (Asrori 2019) Another opinion says disengagement is a process to reject, avoid, or break away from radical groups despite radical understanding (Syahputra and Sukabdi 2021).

Deradicalization and disengagement refers to how individuals (or groups) distance themselves from violent terrorism. While deradicalization intends to affect substantive changes in the outlook on life and actions of individuals or groups, disengagement focuses on providing an attitude shift away

from violent methods(Sirait, Syauqillah, and Hanita 2021).

Disengagement aims to change the behavior of an individual, specifically to ensure that they no longer resort to violence and withdraw from the radical organization. Disengagement can be used to confirm that someone has left terrorism behind. In contrast, deradicalization is a process that focuses more on moderating and altering an individual's beliefs. On the other hand, from a criminological perspective, this can be depicted through the lens of rational choice theory, which considers the rational thinking of the actor, taking into account their motives, strategies, and structures when weighing their actions (Horgan, 2008). For example, a terrorist may leave a radical organization and cease engaging in violence due to the increasingly effective counterterrorism strategies and efforts of the state or due to receiving financial assistance from the government. From this perspective, behavioral change can occur. However, on the other hand, this change in behavior cannot yet be considered permanent, making it vulnerable to the potential for relapse. This can happen if the change in behavior is not accompanied by a change or shift in the beliefs or thinking of the individual. Simply put, a terrorist can change their behavior (leave the terrorist organization and cease violence) as long as the benefits of moderation or incentives received by the individual outweigh the costs or disadvantages. In other words, disengagement is a conditioning that is only temporary and carries the risk of potential relapse behavior. Therefore, a

method is needed to modify behavior in the long term and permanently.

A theory in applied social psychology states that prolonged exposure to instrumental compliance can lead to identity change through three mechanisms. First, an individual eventually follows and complies with a rule or norm through habituation or routine. In this case, the individual is not given a specific approach to change their thoughts or beliefs, but in the absence of incentives and sanctions, they can still experience the disengagement process. Second, to avoid psychological dissonance, the individual will adapt their behavior according to the preferred option they have chosen to align with their actions. This process can be referred to as rationalization. Third, the individual's efforts to adjust their behavior can lead to an internal dialogue that results in the acceptance and awareness of new beliefs (Horgan, 2008). This is particularly true when ideology plays a significant role in motivating certain types of extremists, such as radical Islam, where the main motivation stems from beliefs/religion. As a result, they are not easily influenced by material incentives and punishments, which can pose difficulties in achieving disengagement and deradicalization. Therefore, the process of disengagement begins with the emergence of a trigger, often in the form of an emotional crisis or a traumatic event that opens up the space for questioning thoughts and doubts about the ideology and the radical group.

It is necessary to identify the barriers that former extremists consider when attempting to leave the extremist network. Often, even though the individual has decided to leave the network, the radical group may not be willing to "release" its members, leading to efforts to pull them back, sometimes through violent means. Conversely, it can also be difficult to leave a group and network due to certain benefits gained by being part of that group, such as protection, status, and prestige (Horgan, 2008). In the end, the individual will decide to separate themselves from the radical group or network when the benefits and usefulness gained from leaving the group outweigh the benefits of remaining with the group. Horgan refers to this as an "exit barrier" and an "exit strategy." Figure 2 represents the framework of the disengagement model according to (Horgan, 2008).

Figure 2
Model Disengagement Framework
Source : (Horgan, 2008)

The disengagement strategy is replicated in the form of real activities needed to continue their lives such as finding jobs, economic empowerment, helping to create small businesses or managing government documents such as

ID cards or other documents. Disengagement towards former terrorism convicts cannot be generalized because each has a different process and background of joining a terrorist group. But the same problem occurs when ex-convicts get out of prison, namely economic problems. The obstacle for former prisoners to get a job to support themselves and their families is due to the negative stigma of being perpetrators of terror acts (Syahputra and Sukabdi 2021). The successful implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 NRI Constitution when in the context of ideology can face radicalism and terrorism movements so as to strengthen national resilience. Pancasila and the 1945 NRI Constitution, which are believed to be true, lived and practiced by former terrorism prisoners in the behavior of daily social life, will be an effective force to reject and ward off the potential re-emergence of the seeds of radicalism and terrorism (Budiman, Taufiq, and Nurholis 2022)).

Personal experiences of former Indonesian terrorists who have gone through deradicalization, it is found that they experience identity threats because of their identity as former terrorist convicts. Thus, it brings a negative impact on their positive mindset. Many former terrorists confidently reevaluate their past and reformulate it as part of their current identity, especially when disapproval from their former colleagues arises. To combat public stigma, they hide their old identities while reinforcing their personal characteristics in interpersonal relationships(Mubaraq et al. 2022).

Effective deradicalization and disengagement methods will increase national resilience, because national resilience is seen as a state where a country can overcome difficulties from within and outside, so as to improve the quality of life in the country. National resilience is the strength of a nation that forms a unity (Budiman, Taufiq, and Nurholis 2022).

In addition to the deradicalization and disengagement strategy model described above, it is also appropriate to carry out a form of evaluation and supervision that is carried out regularly and periodically after the pronunciation of the pledge of allegiance. Evaluation and supervision of ex-prisoners is crucial because from this it can be known whether the ex-prisoners are still in communication with terrorist cells or not so that the success rate of deradicalization can also be measured, because terrorism cannot be started from oneself without outside influences, Deradicalization cannot succeed without penetration into the environment of the prisoner or ex-prisoner himself. On the other hand, the influence and attitudes of people or communities outside the radical napiter network also have a major impact on the process of napiter integration.

Evaluation, Supervision and Integration

Another thing that deserves serious attention is the existence of the doctrine of *taqiyyah*, which means abandoning something obligatory in order to maintain oneself or avoid threats or interference (Shihab 2022) *Taqiyyah* is an act of

pretense in front of the party considered to be the enemy, which is implemented by prisoners by carrying out pretense in front of officers or officials of the Indonesian state because Indonesia is considered a tyrannical country. Thus, lying in front of representatives of the state is considered a permissibility. *Taqiyyah* is not infrequently carried out by prisoners in the deradicalization program they participate in with the intention of obtaining certain facilities or smoothness, or reducing their sentence, by, one of which is to recite the Pledge of Allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia. Making a promise or pledge that they will remain loyal to those who oppress them is a form of *taqiyyah* that can be easily carried out by these prisoners. However, on the other hand, identifying the purity of the pledge of allegiance is very difficult for the state to do, in this case the assessors in the deradicalization program. Thus, there is a need for a detection model for the use of *taqiyyah* by prisoners in deradicalization programs supported by methods other than those that have been running so far. From this picture described, it can be seen how the pronunciation of the pledge of loyalty as one of the parameters for the success of the deradicalization program needs to be reviewed.

Because it is difficult to know whether a prisoner has completely abandoned his radical ideology and extremism groups or not, indicators that show the success parameters of the program carried out become one of the crucial things that need to be compiled.

Such as the ability of ex-prisoners to build social groups that form new behaviors that are acceptable to the community in accordance with applicable norms and regulations, the acceptance of ex-prisoners in the community / society where they live, and have a safe and stable job. In addition, the periodic evaluation of former prisoners as well as supervision and assistance for prisoners and families to join and adapt to the community and the surrounding environment is expected to reduce recidivism.

However, as long as there is no new formulation for the treatment of prisoners, effective methods of rehabilitation, deradicalization and disengagement, continuous testing, *periodical assessment* and strict supervision, carried out by the state comprehensively, can undoubtedly be a form of great support for prisoners or ex-prisoners not to re-join their radical groups and abandon violent methods. As the author had said, implementation is not as easy as writing in theory, in practice there are many obstacles that are still often encountered in the continuity of the program as well as effective supervision and evaluation. Some of them, in addition to requiring considerable funds, but also needed experts in their respective fields.

CONCLUSIONS

Deradicalization and disengangement are important processes for former terrorism convicts to return to the general public, be well accepted and no longer use violence and withdraw from radical organizations. Activities carried out

in the process of deradicalization and disengagement still have not achieved optimal results as seen from several cases of former terrorism convicts committing acts of terror again. This happens because ex-convicts commit *taqiyyah* or an act of pretense and declare themselves loyal to the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, the methods applied in the process of deradicalization and disengangement are considered less effective because they only revolve around lectures or patronizing, while the root problem approach of an inmate committing an act of terror is not explored optimally so that the approach to the method is not effective. This article concludes that methods are needed to be more effective in the process of deradicalization and disengangement as well as processes of evaluation, supervision and integration that can be used to assess the success of the deradicalization and disengangement process that former terrorism prisoners have gone through so that no more ex-prisoners return to their organizations and radical thoughts. Some actions that can be taken to be able to streamline the process by involving experts or experts in the form of psychiatrists or psychologists in the process of changing the mindset of terrorism prisoners. Humanizing humans is one method that can be done to deal with terrorism prisoners in a more humane way to change them to the radical ideology of terrorism to moderate. Efforts for religious education or general education for terrorism prisoners, because education can defeat terrorism.

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