

INDONESIA'S QUIET DIPLOMACY TOWARDS ROHINGYA: AN EFFECTIVE WAY IN RESOLVING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

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ABSTRACT

The current Rohingya situation has been addressed through international initiatives. Quiet diplomacy transitions to loud diplomacy. The situation in Rakhine State has improved because of such diplomatic advances. This essay sought to examine Indonesia's approach to helping Rohingya through humanitarian aid. This study will investigate the mechanism of mediation and its particular techniques, such as *multi-party involvement*, *manufactured discourse*, and *fourth parties*, using the Quiet Diplomacy approach. The contribution of Indonesia also covered in this paper mainly related to *interfaith dialogue*. The research in this study shows that Indonesian engagement in global, regional, and national collaborative collaboration is having a substantial impact on reducing tension in the Rakhine States.

Keywords: Rohingya, Mediation, Collaborative cooperation, Quiet Diplomacy

INTRODUCTION

The Rohingya case so far can be said to be a case that has no end of resolution. Ethnic cleansing, which has occurred for centuries, still has to be found a way out through many efforts made by various countries in the world, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Based on the history of Myanmar, this country consists of 135 types of races/tribes and some of them are unknown tribes, one of which is the Rohingya. Other tribes, such as the Kachin, Chin, Rakhine, Shan, and others, live in border areas outside Myanmar, known as Frontier Areas. Until now there are around 800,000-1,100,000

Rohingya in Myanmar of which 80% live in Rakhine State. The two main areas where the Rohingya live, namely Maungdaw and Buthidaung in northern Myanmar bordering Bangladesh. Rohingya are actually Sunni Muslims who make up 1/3 of the total population of 1,100,000 Rakhine State in Myanmar. The Myanmar government claims that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh and rejects their presence and is not recognized as one of the 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar (Warzone Initiatives, 2015).

As of June 2020, the number of displaced persons in Myanmar reaching

approximately 1,9 million people. Unfortunately, 1,6 million of them were Rohingya (UNHCR, 2021). Due to its significant numbers, Rohingya outspreaded in several countries in in Asia Pacific, for instance, 860.000 people in Bangladesh, 101.000 people in Malaysia, 18.000 people in India, and in several other countries with few small numbers, mainly in Indonesia, Nepal, Thailand and so on (UNHCR, 2021). The growing number of Rohingya exodus to Bangladesh

The Government of Myanmar whom not willing to accept their presence eventually reside them in the outside border of Myanmar in which close to Bangladesh. Tracing back to its history, Myanmar was colonised by the British whom divided Arakan region to be inhabited by Rohingya Muslims and Arakanese Bhuddist. The rise of hostility and hatred growing since Arakanese Bhuddist acted toward the Rohingyas as alien. The status of Rohingya Muslims who were treated as "foreign people" also supported by the 1982 Citizenship Act which triggered several human rights violations toward Rohingya Muslims, such as, rape and murder (Faye, 2021).

Since the violence against Rohingyas outbreak and mass killing of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State raising, numerous international response emerge to face this ethnic cleansing. Countries in the world mainly neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia start to condemn Myanmar due to its implausible in being responsible of

the people in Myanmar mainly Rohingya Muslims. ASEAN as a regional organisation in which Myanmar is one of the member states also creating strategies to cease the murder and massacre. Based on its legal framework, ASEAN Charter stated "non-interference in internal affairs of ASEAN Member States". Such stipulated statement encourage ASEAN in each meeting to pursue agreement through multilateral way. Means that all human rights issues which undergoing in ASEAN have to be resolved respectfully and not trespass the sovereignty of other member states (Shivakoti, 2017).

Furthermore, Along with its basic and fundamental rule as stated in ASEAN Charter, the article 14 directly states, "*in conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.*" As a part of multilateral effort, in 2009, ASEAN also established ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to address various human rights cases in ASEAN. AICHR is an umbrella for the sub-unit or so called division which work on human rights issues in ASEAN. This overarching body in ASEAN has done numerous progress and improvement since its establishment. AICHR working on its out of 14 mandates, some of them, for instance, 1). Initiating strategy for the promotion and protection of human rights and basic human rights freedom to supplement the building of ASEAN

Community, 2) Establishing ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in order to encourage regional cooperation through numerous ASEAN Convention and other instruments related to human rights, 3) Encouraging people awareness of human rights value in ASEAN through education, research and exchange of information and so on (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016).

In relations to the above, AICHR operates its mandates strictly based on the Term of Reference (TOR). Several important points in dealing with human rights issues enshrined in the TOR, *inter alia*, 1). Respect for principles of ASEAN as embodied in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter, notably a) respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States; b) non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States; c) respect for the right of every Member State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion (AICHR, 2009). Responding to the Rohingya crisis AICHR responsible for protecting the rights of people in ASEAN regardless their identity. However, due to its fundamental legal framework, AICHR unable to interfere the sovereignty of ASEAN member states who engage in human rights infringe. Such thing due to the mechanism in reaching agreement in ASEAN which based on consensus, means that when a member state disagree with the decision there will be no agreement (Thamrin, 2011).

Regarding the above matter, (Limsiritong, 2019) argue that the TOR of AICHR limit the work of AICHR for addressing human rights issues in ASEAN. As stipulated in the above point notably C which states, "respect for the right of every Member States to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion and coercion," in the case of Rohingya, he continued that Rohingya issue has become ultimate responsibility of Myanmar Government as the main actor in making decision for the state. Meanwhile, (Rachminawati and Mokhtar, 2019) highlighted that the rules and the implementation of action of ASEAN does not reflecting human rights protection value toward Rohingya. AICHR is acknowledged as not neutral due its operation heavy lean on ASEAN mechanism.




Figure 1: The relationships between the AICHR and the Rohingya Case through the ASEAN Charter (Limsiritong, 2019)

Another stepping stone of ASEAN in resolving Rohingya crisis is the important role of ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR). APHR seeks to resolve human rights violations against Rohingya through collaboration with other actors, such as, International Detention

Coalition, Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network and Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (Forum-Asia). This collaboration attempts to defend the right of Rohingya to avoid mental, physical and emotional problems which resulted in traumatic events, mental health mainly in detention centre of refugee. It is proven by the establishment of Malaysia Detention Centre namely Kem Sri Impian Depot Imigresen Sementara Relau to accommodate the exodus of Rohingya to Malaysia. The operation of this centre is to shelter Rohingya refugee before obtaining asylum seeker entitlement (ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, 2022).

Apart from the technical matters in resolving Rohingya crisis, ASEAN also making effort through diplomatic ways in conducting several meetings to address the issues. In 2009 ASEAN Summit, ASEAN member states leaders conveyed mutual voice in imploring Myanmar Government to take actions. Responding to such matter, the result of the meeting was unsatisfying since the Chairman of the meeting mentioned that Rohingyas were entitled as "illegal migrants." The meeting was agreed to continue the discussion of the issue in Bali Democracy Forum. Meanwhile the case of Rohingya crisis was remain frail due to its normative and rhetorical nuance. This case is also not deemed urgent to be responded (Pudjibudojo, 2019).

In relations to the above, as ASEAN Member States, Indonesia and

Malaysia were vocal in echoing the voice to resolve Rohingya crisis. Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib Razak, for instance, has openly denounced Myanmar in ASEAN Meeting and mentioned "genocide". He also urged Aung San Suu Kyi as the credential leader to be responsible for the ongoing domestic violence in her country. Malaysia was also supported by Malaysia's Youth and Sports Minister, Khairy Jamaluddin, to re-asses the membership of Myanmar in ASEAN (Ha and Htut, 2016).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Quiet Diplomacy

While recognizing that situations with these elements may easily include non-coercive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy using quiet/silent methods (as opposed to "gun-boat diplomacy" supported by the threat of force or "public diplomacy," which uses publicity). The techniques and options that may be used in quiet diplomacy, which is defined here as intergovernmental or "third-party" contact that varies from the traditional diplomacy of an interested party or government. It is high-level, or Track I, diplomacy that involves official decision-makers, even if every situation is unique and likely mixes a range of options and tactics, including interaction with Track II (with non-officials) or Track I (blended) processes. In order to pursue the goal of quiet diplomacy, there are some techniques which can be utilized (Collins and Packer, 2006)

Mediation

This is an essential tools and inseparable method in resolving conflict. At the moment when conflicted states do not willing to build a constructive communication, a neutral third party having responsibility to take into account. There are some criteria in mediation to achieve win-win solution during conflict. Under this technique, there are some criteria to form an effective mediation, for instance; *multi-party engagement, and structured dialogue.*

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Through the 2010s, Indonesia's middle-of-the-road diplomatic strategy—dubbed "quiet" or "soft" diplomacy—evolved. Indonesia participated in several forums in 2012, especially the oic, which it saw as having a crucial role to play in the crisis. However, from 2014 to 2019—the first term of President Jokowi—as the Indonesia backed off as criticism of Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya increased, saying that a more "constructive" diplomatic strategy centered on assistance delivery was required. In order to resolve the problem, the Indonesian government then concentrated on bilateral and regional channels, maintaining what it called a "open door" and "building trust" with the Myanmar authorities. Throughout the 2010s, it seemed improbable that Myanmar's treatment of the Rohingya would be met with universal condemnation, an international sanctions regime, or a call

to employ collective force required by a UN Security Council resolution. However, it is important to remember the consequences of similar activities in Indonesia over East Timor 20 years earlier. Despite mounting pressure from powerful Islamic organizations calling for a firmer official position on Rohingya human rights protection, Jokowi's administration continued to use a quiet diplomatic approach than R2P (Smith and Williams, 2021).

Multi-party Engagement

To handle a crisis, multi-party involvement entails a variety of players working concurrently or sequentially, including people, States, international organizations, and civil society groups. It requires careful planning, collaboration, and building on each participant's contributions. Maximizing the potential the strategy offers and minimizing the issues raised by various entrance points, forms of leverage, degrees of participation, and divergent interests and objectives all contribute to success (Collins and Packer, 2006)

Cooperative activities must be adopted in order for the mediation process to successfully resolve the Rohingya crisis. (Gorlick, 2019) suggested that another choice is to be resettled in another nation. Even if there is a negligible amount of direct passage of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh to third countries, this is generally accomplished through unofficial means, at great expense, and with considerable personal risk. Globally,

the most common strategy for protecting refugees is restricted movement through third-country resettlement. IOM and UNHCR are on board, and the government is involved. As an illustration, Malaysia generously allows an estimated 150,000 Rohingya from Myanmar to reside there, the majority of whom are registered with UNHCR as mandate refugees (Gorlick, 2019). Malaysia also helps UNHCR and IOM organize third-country resettlement by allowing refugees with specific protection needs to leave the country. Several nations, including Canada, the United States, Japan, and New Zealand, have benefited from the resettlement of several thousand Rohingya refugees from Malaysia during the previous ten years. For UNHCR and IOM, relocation programs are regular activity that can prevent or lessen any pull factor or fraud concerns. Any first relocation of people from Bangladesh is likely to be small in scale and give priority to those who require urgent protection, such as women who have been the victims of abuse, people who are ill, and family members who have been split up. The Bangladeshi government may want to rethink its policy of allowing resettlement from foreign countries (Gorlick, 2019).

ASEAN resist to take "silent" mode of diplomacy, however, the EU pursuing sanctions towards Myanmar. (Heiduk, 2018) adding that the European Union (EU) threatened to revoke the trade privileges that guarantee Myanmar enjoys duty-free access to the

EU single market in reaction to the deterioration of the country's human rights situation in October 2018. However, it appears quite likely that such actions would not affect the military or the Burmese government's political calculus. Instead, the country's predominantly female textile industry workers would be the ones to suffer the most from the elimination of the trade privileges. Therefore, the EU and its Member States must to take into account a mix of particular sanctions against military businesses as well as more stringent entry restrictions and account freezes that are targeted at senior military officers. The amount of diplomatic engagement with Myanmar's civilian actors should be increased in tandem with these targeted sanctions against the country's armed forces.

From the explanation above, it can be concluded that ASEAN and EU have different reactions in seeing Rohingya crisis. Furthermore, multi-party engagement also can be pursued through ASEAN Dialogue Partner, notably European Union (EU). When ASEAN was first established, it was crucial that it be a partnership rather than an imposing organization like the United Nations or the European Union because of the various features of its ten members. A key point to keep in mind is that ASEAN refers to an organization whose mission is to advance regional peace via positive engagement and conversation, which gives rise to the "ASEAN Way" of diplomacy (Nguyen, 2018). She is also argue that the 'ASEAN

Way' has deliberately discouraged member nations from interfering in one another's domestic affairs and has made it clear from the outset that coercive measures would not be utilized. Because of this, this IGO has virtually abstained from enforcing sanctions in favor of a strategy known as "quiet diplomacy." This strategy has also been applied to its response to the Rohingya issue (Nguyen, 2018).

Structured Dialogue

A group discussion may be organized using structured dialogue by specifying who should talk to whom, about what, when, and how. The parties are free to concentrate their attention on what is most essential thanks to a well-defined structure. Structured discussion formats typically provide the participants set times and places to exchange opinions and talk about various parts of their problems. The third party must weigh the benefits and drawbacks of "closed" vs "open" discussion, including the involvement of others, including outside specialists, and decide how much of the debate should be open-ended and free-ranging, which entails dangers of speculative thinking, dissension, and diffusion. The third party must similarly understand the significance of processes with clear criteria for participants, periodicity, leading agents, handling of minutes, and connections with other processes (Collins and Packer, 2006).

Indonesia actively contributes to promoting international peace, as

required by the 1945 Constitution. President Joko Widodo reaffirmed this, saying that as the third-biggest nation in the world and the nation with the greatest population of moderate and pluralistic Muslims, Indonesia has a duty to contribute to the solution of international problems. Strength; 1) Indonesia's soft power ability to share its experience and expertise in democracy and play the role of a mediator or peace facilitator supports Indonesia's diplomacy in preserving global peace. 2) Indonesia cannot remain silent about the suffering endured by the Rohingya in Myanmar. The Rohingya matter is one of Indonesia's top priorities among the various issues that concern it (Pujayanti, 2018).

She also highlighted that Indonesia is actively attempting to take a number of actions to assist in resolving crises in a number of nations, particularly in Myanmar's Rakhine State. Indonesia started making an attempt to improve contact with other parties, including those in Bangladesh and Myanmar. Specifically, by using Formula 4+1 diplomacy (Pujayanti, 2018);

1. Restore stability and security
2. Avoid using force if feasible
3. Protection for all people, regardless of their nationality or religion, and
4. Open access to humanitarian aid are also included.

In order to strengthen capacity and conduct different trainings on democracy and conciliatory processes, Myanmar first dispatched a delegation to Indonesia in January 2017. (Pujayanti,

2018) reported that the first delegation for the Myanmar-Indonesia Interfaith Dialogue (The 1st Indonesia-Myanmar Interfaith Dialogue - IMID) arrived in May 2017. The first IMID took place from May 21 to May 24, 2017 in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. There were about 20 people present, including members of the Indonesian delegation, the Myanmar delegation, and active participants like monks from the Smaratungga Boyolali Buddhist School of Religion, staff from the Yogyakarta Regional Office of the Ministry of Religion, and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. Mr. Khin MaungTu, a member of the Shwe Dagon Pagoda's board of trustees, Mr. Tha Nyan, the organization's general secretary, and Mr. Nyunt Maung Shein, the head of the Islamic Religious Affairs Council, made comprised the delegation from Myanmar that attended the first IMID.

Last but not least, it is also important to note that the fourth specific mechanism of Quiet Diplomacy is engaging *the fourth parties*. This means including independent experts and possible resources providers. Indonesia also boosting its national mechanism to provide humanitarian aid through the role of Islamic Philanthropic organization. (Smith and Williams, 2021) highlighted the role of national Islamic humanitarian action. National Islamic groups pressured the government to take stronger action. Tens of thousands of people rallied in Jakarta in 2017 over the Rohingya situation, calling for

interfaith peace and support for their "Muslim brothers and sisters in Myanmar." The government's adherence to the non-interference policy of ASEAN and the domestic drive for Islamic unity gave rise to a conflict of interest, leading to increasing criticism of the government from strong national Islamic groups. Significant local and international organizations in Indonesia, including the national Zakat organizations Dompot Dhuafa and the PKPU Humanitarian Foundation, became aware of the Rohingya crisis. The two main moderate Islamic non-governmental groups, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), also played significant roles. Together, these national Islamic groups put great political pressure on the government by voicing widespread public anger over the situation of the Rohingya minority.

As a result, the government started identifying Rohingya as refugees rather than migrants, which finally made it possible for aid to reach the communities. But the administration remained committed to preserving its diplomatic ties with Myanmar. The government, being acutely aware of the sensitivities in Myanmar regarding aid going to certain groups but not others, insisted that aid must reach all victims of the conflict in Rakhine, not just the Muslim Rohingya, when interacting with Islamic organizations and networks like the Indonesian Humanitarian Alliance for Myanmar (AKIM) (Smith and Williams, 2021).

CONCLUSION

There are several methods for dealing with humanitarian crises. In accordance with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia chose "quiet diplomacy" as a means of promoting world peace without resorting to force. This article came to the conclusion that Indonesia's strategy of silent action in aid delivery is successful because it uses a diplomatic mechanism to avoid public criticism. In order to help Indonesia demonstrate the importance of diplomacy, a number of cooperative approaches have been used, including mediation and its specialized methodologies, multi-party engagement, organized discourse, and the involvement of third parties.

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