JRSSEM 2023, Vol. 02, No. 6, 1094 1107
E-ISSN: 2807 - 6311, P-ISSN: 2807 - 6494
DOI : 10.36418/jrssem.v2i06.367 https://jrssem.publikasiindonesia.id/index.php/jrssem/index
ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER CASH-CARRYING (CBCC)
THREAT COUNTERMEASURES FROM A CUSTOMS AND
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE
Aditya Rachman Rony Putra
1
Arthur Josias Simon Runturambi
2
National Resilience Study Program Specialization in Strategic Intelligence Studies
School of Strategic and Global Studies
*
e-mail: adityarachmanrony@gmail.com, josiassimonrunturambi@gmail.com
*Correspondence: adityarachmanrony@gmail.com
Submitted
: January 2023
Revised
: January 2023
Accepted
: January 2023
Abstract: This research departs from the problem of potential losses in Indonesia stemming from
the actions of Cross Border Cash Carrying (CBCC). In 2018 it was estimated that there were 12
trillion rupiah suspected of entering Indonesia unreported and suspected to be a criminal practice
of money laundering (TPPU) and financing of terrorism activities. To that end, this article aims to
provide an overview of how CBCC threat countermeasures from a strategic customs and
intelligence perspective. Using a qualitative approach, this article analyzes the problem using
descriptive methods. The data sources used are secondary data derived from open sources such
as news articles, academic research journals and institutional documents related to the problem
under study. The results showed that the CBCC threat in addition to having an impact on economic
aspects is also strongly related to the threat of other transnational crimes such as narcotics
trafficking and terrorism financing. Therefore, this CBCC threat cannot be underestimated and must
get an appropriate approach to overcome it. From a customs and strategic intelligence standpoint,
surveillance of CBCC practices requires a wealth of data from multiple points of view to provide
comprehensive mapping of the problem. In addition, appropriate intelligence data exchange media
is needed so as to enable every surveillance agency, especially the DGCA, to have easy access to
any data needed for surveillance and enforcement. In addition, regulatory improvements and
strengthening the legal foundation continue to be pursued to support the effectiveness of
enforcement in the field.
Keywords: Cross Border Cash Carrying; Intelijen Strategic; Customs; Money Loundering.
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INTRODUCTION
Cross-border cash carrying or what is
known as Cross Border Cash Carrying
(CBCC) or some call it cash smuggling is
one of the major threats that must always
be watched out for in border surveillance
activities. Like the threat of transnational
organized crime (TNOC) such as narcotics,
and smuggling of dangerous goods and
people, CBCC also has a great impact on
national resilience because CBCC's activities
are said to be related to money laundering
and terrorism financing modes. This was
conveyed by the Minister of Home Affairs
(Mendagri) Tito Karnavian who said that
carrying cash and cross-border cash courier
instruments in and out of Indonesia could
be one of the modes of money laundering
(TPPU) and terrorism financing (Farisa,
2022).
The threat of CBCC is certainly very
large, in addition to its relation to TPPU
activities and terrorism, this CBCC is also
very risky to harm state finances because of
the large amount of money circulating
through this illicit activity. The Center for
Financial Transaction Reporting and
Analysis (PPATK), provides estimates of
hundreds of trillions of those entering the
jurisdiction of Indonesia that are not
reported by related parties. Furthermore,
PPATK said that the average value is 2018
was around Rp 12 trillion, and in 2019
around Rp 3 trillion entered Indonesia
without being reported. Furthermore, the
Head of PPATK Ivan Yustiavandana (2012)
also mentioned that there were indications
of CBCC practices because a CBCC case was
found by someone who reported carrying
cash 4 times but based on Passenger Risk
Management (PRM) data, the person had it
154 times (KumparanBisnis, 2022).
CBCC's activities are brought to the
attention of relevant institutions and bodies
in Indonesia by making various efforts to
narrow the space for CBCC actors. This is
certainly very important because of its
huge impact on Indonesia. As previously
stated, CBCC can be part of TPPU and
terrorism activities, so CBCC can be part of
organized crime such as the crime of
smuggling dangerous goods. For this
reason, this paper wants to focus on
discussing the following things: First, how
the CBCC threat has been found on the
Indonesian border. And second, how the
strategic intelligence approach monitors
CBCC threats more effectively and
efficiently along with efforts to narrow the
space for CBCC actors in terms of
regulatory change & strengthening.
THEORETICAL REVIEW
Cross Border Cash Carrying (CBCC)
Based on the Regulation of the
Minister of Finance (PMK) of the Republic
of Indonesia Number 100 / PMK.04 / 2018
Cross Border Cash Carrying (CBCC) or
carrying cash and/or other payment
instruments or also often mentioned as
cash smuggling is an action that is in
conflict with the state's efforts to achieve
and maintain the stability of the rupiah
value through monetary control over the
traffic of carrying foreign banknotes into
and out of the Indonesian customs area
(Ministry of Finance, 2018).
Meanwhile, the NRA Indonesia report
(2015) it is stated that cross-border carrying
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of money has an upper limit on the amount
allowed to be carried. However, even
though there is a provision for the
maximum value of money that must be
reported to customs officers through the
CBCC report, in practice, there are still
loopholes where the carrying of the cash
involves different people and the value
carried does not reach the maximum limit
that must be reported coupled with the
possibility of entry of terrorist members
without going through official channels.
Money Laundering Act (TPPU)
According to the Law of the Republic
of Indonesia Number 8 of 2010 concerning
the Prevention and Eradication of Money
Laundering Crimes, money laundering
crimes are defined as any act that meets the
elements of a criminal act involving
financial transactions mentioned in
accordance with the provisions in the
applicable Law. It is further stated that the
perpetrator of this criminal act is any Person
who places, transfers, transfers spend, pays,
gives, entrusts, carries abroad, changes the
form, exchanges for currency or securities
or other acts of Wealth that he knows or
reasonably suspects is the result of a
criminal act with the aim of concealing or
disguising the origin of the Wealth. (Berutu,
2019)
Strategic Intelligence
Citing McDowell's (2009) statement
that strategic intelligence analysis can be
considered a special form of research that
addresses any problem at a broad and
detailed level to be able to describe threats,
risks, and opportunities that can be utilized
so that it is helpful to determine the right
programs and policies in solving problems.
Further experts on strategic intelligence
argue that strategic intelligence and its
analytical practices focus on the ability to
creatively think about one's way through
problems at the macro level while
maintaining a pragmatic relationship with
inevitable tactical and operational impacts
and outcomes (McDowell, 2009; Prunckun,
2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This research is qualitative descriptive
research by analyzing the phenomenon of
Cross Border Cash Carrying (CBCC) threats
to the resilience of the Indonesian state.
The data collection technique used is a
literature study method or documentation
study sourced from scientific review
literature such as journals, research related
to theses/dissertations, and documents of
related institutions/agencies/institutions
such as djbc and the Indonesian Ministry of
Finance. The analysis carried out is a
descriptive analysis by describing/
describing a series of facts and events
related to the observed problem.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Threat of Cross-Border Cash Carrying
(CBCC) on the Indonesian Border
As previously stated, Cross Border Cash
Carrying (CBCC) or cash smuggling
activities are called by Home Minister Tito
Karnavian as a big threat because it can be
one of the modes of money laundering
(TPPU) and terrorism financing that will risk
national economic resilience and security.
Generally, threats that include CBCC
activities are related to transnational
organized crime (TNOC) threats such as
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money laundering from narcotics activities
and other prohibited goods, financing
various acts of terrorism, and attempts to
disguise special transactions for the
purpose of evading certain fees or levies
from a country.
First, CBCC as an effort to launder
money from illicit activities (such as
narcotics) is considered the main threat
that can harm Indonesia's economy and
national security. CBCC or cash smuggling
violation activities have long been referred
to as rationing efforts that are strongly
associated with drug dealers. According to
research conducted by Almanzar (2013)
cash smuggling of crime cases from
Mexico, a large group of TNOC
perpetrators carries out drug trafficking in
the United States that generates billions of
dollars in revenue annually. The money
generated is known to be transferred by the
CBCC method. The perpetrators of
narcotics trafficking and CBCC are also
inseparable from groups involved in a wide
and diverse criminal activity as their main
business practice. Their crimes are
indicated across territories that cover more
than one national and economic border.
The numbers are no joke, in the case of
Mexico in 2003, it was estimated that the
global drug trade generated about $321.6
billion. This amount of money led these
crime groups to raise their illicit funds and
"launder" them in such a way as to make
their business continue to run well.
Interestingly, rather than structuring and
injecting their funds into the financial
system of the United States, this group
prefers to clean up their money in Mexico
and other countries. This is because the U.S.
has stepped up surveillance since the first
money laundering law was enacted. So
CBCC by bringing money in the form of
cash through the border is their effort to be
able to launder their money in other
countries. (Almanzar, 2013)
Based on a report by the US National
Drug Intelligence Center, it is estimated that
criminals or TNOC perpetrators of these
narcotics smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion
a year in large amounts of cash across the
border in the Southwest region. The impact
is that whenever large remittances,
stemming from criminal activity cross
successfully across the U.S. Southwest
border, the U.S. government and economy
are said to have failed to generate hidden
revenues from the confiscation of the
proceeds of these crimes and it is even
thought to be helping to perpetuate the
efforts of the criminals who generated the
funds.(Almanzar, 2013)
So it can be said that CBCC or the
indication of cash smuggling, which is
estimated at trillions of rupiah entering
Indonesian territory, cannot be simply
released from other dangers such as
narcotics trafficking. This indication is
getting stronger because the activity of
circulating or buying and selling narcotics is
called Almanzar, (2013) as a cash business,
where goods of high value, are produced
by several large suppliers, and sold by
countless small business people and spread
over a very large area in exchange or
exchange of cash.
Second, CBCC is a media perpetrator of
TNOC in financing crimes such as terrorism.
Based on The Minister of Home Affairs Tito
Karnavian, CBCC can be indicated as an
effort made by criminals to fund acts of
terrorism in Indonesia. This statement
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certainly has strong reasons, one of which
is based on the National Risk Assessment
/NRA (2015) the way of transferring
terrorist funds through the carrying of cash
both domestically and across national
borders (cash smuggling) is a high-risk way
of transferring funds for the financing of
terrorism. Although this CBCC method for
funding something that has a large cost has
disadvantages in terms of limited amounts
of money that can be moved, relatively
large costs, and a relatively long transfer
time, the CBCC for terrorism financing has
the advantage of being difficult to trace the
flow of funds both the origin of funds and
the purpose of the flow of funds.
It is because of the difficulty of tracing
the origin of these funds that perpetrators
of acts of terrorism rely heavily on the CBCC
fund flow method to fund their activities.
Furthermore, the NRA (2015) cited one of
the reasons for the difficulty of tracing the
flow of money for the financing of terrorism
because of the transfer of funds in cash
using couriers or different people both for
carrying within the country and across
national borders with a certain face value.
For cross-border carrying of money,
although there is a provision for the
maximum value of money that must be
reported to border officers through the
cross border cash-carrying (CBCC) report,
in practice there is still a gap where the
carrying of cash involves different people
and the value carried does not reach the
maximum limit that must be reported plus
there is a possibility of entry of terrorist
members without going through official
channels.
For this reason, the way of transferring
terrorism funds through the carrying of
cash or similar instruments (cash
smuggling) both within Indonesia and
across national borders is classified as high
risk. Thus, FATF number 32 regarding the
carrying of cash (cash couriers) emphasizes
that every country must ensure that border
authorities or customs officers have the
authority to stop/withhold money or
similar instruments that are suspected to be
related to the financing of terrorism, money
laundering or other criminal acts or that are
reported incorrectly. Furthermore, the NRA
(2015) also mentioned that one of the real
examples of CBCC's connection to terrorism
occurred in 2008, when a non-Indonesian
national was arrested for carrying cash
many times where once in Indonesia
carrying cash with a value of at least 30,000
USD in US dollar denominations and was
known to have meetings with parties
affiliated with acts of terrorism in Indonesia,
one of which was suspected of being
financing suicide bombings at JW Mariot
Hotel Building and Ritz Calton Hotel in
Mega Kuningan Jakarta in July 2009.
Third, CBCC is an effort by perpetrators
to avoid reporting related to taxes or the
like. Quoting Almanzar, (2013) the
smuggling of large amounts of cash or
CBCC is a growing problem with the
economic security of even the United
States. This can happen because this CBCC
practice is an attempt made by the
perpetrator to avoid the required reporting.
Banyangkan indications of the influx of
money into Indonesia, which is said to have
the potential to reach 12 trillion in 2018 and
3 trillion in 2019, is the result of business by
overseas Indonesian entrepreneurs who
can be taxed a certain amount.
So the CBCC certainly has a
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detrimental impact on the economy of any
country if this practice is left without
restrictions. So CBCC is essentially the
threat of smuggling large amounts of
money as a practice that has been adapted
to circumvent a country's laws (such as
reporting and imposition of certain levies),
evading law enforcement (which seeks to
avoid reporting the origin of the money,
and the ongoing efforts made to fund illicit
activities.
Strategic Intelligence Approach Oversight
and Counteract Cross Border Cash Carrying
(CBCC) Threats
These threats and risks that can be
obtained by Indonesia are very vital to
Indonesia's national security, therefore
many relevant agencies or agencies have
the authority and duty to limit the
occurrence of such criminal practices. In
Indonesia, financial transaction supervision
is the authority of the Center for Financial
Transaction Reporting and Analysis (PPATK)
based on Law Number 8 of 2010
concerning the Prevention and Eradication
of Money Laundering Crimes (TPPU). At the
border, the customs function that
supervises the entry/exit of large amounts
of cash is certainly a task carried out by the
Directorate General of Customs and Excise
(DJBC), in addition, the licensing of carrying
cash must also not be separated from
supervision from Bank Indonesia (BI).
Since there is more than one agency
conducting oversight in the threat of CBCC
crimes, effective oversight must be carried
out with synergy between these agencies/
agencies. From a strategic intelligence
standpoint, there are several key things that
need to be done to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of surveillance.
1. Analysis of intelligence data sourced
from all agencies/ agencies.
Like other intelligence
products, strategic intelligence
efforts in tackling CBCC threats also
rely heavily on a wealth of data that
can be properly analyzed and
interpreted to map everything
related to threats. To quote
McDowell, (2009) in a major cycle of
the intelligence process, there are
several stages that need to be
considered and planned very well.
Some of the stages mentioned: First,
the task and focus of intelligence to
be executed. Second, strategic
research project planning. Third,
collect data and information. The
fourth is to compile and evaluate the
data. The fifth conduct the
appropriate analysis. The sixth
develops specific concepts and
hypothesis related to the observed
problems, and the seventh prepares a
report on the results of the strategic
research.
All of these things are of course
also done in other intelligence
processes or stages, but basically, all
these processes have the main
difference when the context is
strategic intelligence. The specific
goal of strategic intelligence is to
provide accurate long-term
intelligence to enable effective high-
level planning and management of
law enforcement resources to meet
the overall perceived threat. This is
not just an activity directed directly at
the tactical objectives of law
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Customs And Strategic Intelligence Perspective
enforcement. The adaptation of the
standard intelligence cycle, rather
than a massive change, is necessary
in the context of the prevention of
problems in the realm of strategic
intelligence (McDowell, 2009)
Returning to the context of the
CBCC threat, the strategic intelligence
process that is carried out depends
largely on how the data obtained or
owned by all agencies, can be the
best input to provide a broad point of
view for all parties involved. For this
reason, in the context of the
intelligence process that McDowell
mentioned, in the context of this
CBCC threat, it should go through the
following process:
The first process, the task and
focus of intelligence to be carried out
and directly related to the second
process of how to plan a strategic
research project that should be
promised. With regard to these two
things, an institution that has a focus
on handling CBCC should essentially
have some focus organized in several
layers of tasks and an observation
focus. At the core of this observation
layer, the focus should be on the
search for strategic intelligence data
and information related to the
context of financial transaction
supervision institutions and
performance such as PPATK, BI, and
DJBC. Meanwhile, the next layer of
strategic intelligence focus relates to
other agencies that have to do with
financial transactions derived from
CBCC actions such as narcotics
trafficking from BNN, BIN, and
counterterrorism from BNPT.
Furthermore, the third process
is related to how to collect data and
information. The availability of
information from each layer of such
related institutions must be met. Each
relevant agency should
accommodate available intelligence
data that can provide an in-depth
and specific point of view according
to their respective duties and
functions. Furthermore, the data
enters the fourth stage where the
data is collected and compiled and
then evaluated the data related to the
quality and linkage of the desired
context, so that it can be continued in
the fifth process, namely conducting
an analysis in accordance with the
desired goals and expectations.
Sixth, from the in-depth data of
each institution, the development of
specific concepts and hypotheses
related to the problem observed with
a broad and complex point of view
will be obtained. So that in the final
result, this complete data and
information will be a significant input
in the report on the results of the
strategic research.
In simple terms what is done can be
described in the following simple scheme in
figure 1. Based on figure 1, the first attempt
that needs to be made is to get a broad
point of view by working on all the data
from many related usmbers. So that the
evaluation of strategies and policies should
be based on the results of the analysis of all
these data. So that the handling and
supervision of illegal CBCC practices can be
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There are several focusesarranged in several layers of tasks
and observation focuses according to institutions directly
related to the CBCC.
Layer 1: PPATK, BI and DJBC transaction supervision
Layer 2: assumed surveillance on other CBCC-related
issues such as narcotics and terrorism by BNN, BIN, BNPT
and Police
Layer 3: the other indirectly related.
carried out more effectively and efficiently
so as to minimize the risk of losses that can
be obtained by the Indonesian
government.
Figure 1. Intelligence Processes in the Context of CBCC Practice Oversight
2. Development of an integrated
intelligence data exchange system.
The collection of data obtained
from various data sources, of course,
has not become the focus of solving
problems in terms of customs and
strategic intelligence. Effective and
efficient enforcement will not be
possible when the access of
surveillance and enforcement
implementers does not run smoothly
on the intelligence data and
information that has been collected,
previous selection, and analysis. In
this regard, McDowell (2009) said
that data needs are the main needs in
taking action. It is further submitted
that as far as requests for information
input, the work of strategic
intelligence relies heavily on the
range of existing intelligence
implementers and investigative data
that may already be owned and used
regularly in an organization.
(McDowell, 2009) For this reason,
synergy in data exchange is one of
the other supporting factors that are
very vital in supervision.
Strategic
Intelligence
Flow
Define
intelligence
tasks and
focus
Planning strategic
research projects
Collect all data and
information from
every source
Data
preparation
and evaluation
Data analysis
Concept
development
and
observation
analysis
Report
Output:
Appropriate
Oversight
Policies and
Strategies fit
all points of
view.
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Based on the context of
strategic intelligence, the concept of
a fusion center is an attempt or
answer to answer the synergy
between agencies in the exchange of
intelligence data. McDowell (2009)
argues that data and information
from these various sources,
regardless of the purpose of their
collection, will always be the main
data bank for the commencement of
strategic activities both at the
strategic and operational levels.
Especially for the DJBC which is a
border guard agency and as an initial
filter for the entry of crime threats
into Indonesian territory, the
availability of surveillance media in
the context of intelligence such as
fusion centers will certainly greatly
help the surveillance of people
passing through the Indonesian
border.
Various experts mention that the
concept of a fusion center is the best
way to exchange intelligence
information for many law
enforcement agencies in an area. In
their research, Carter & Carter, (2009)
stated that the (Carter & Carter, 2009)
fusion center method of sharing
information makes the intelligence
environment of the community in a
country facilitated in terms of
performance in detecting the
occurrence of terrorist activities.
Therefore, in addition to good
detection of terrorism, the fusion
center is also an effort to make it
easier for an agency related to CBCC
violations to obtain important
information that Perhaps only other
institutions that have different
authorities can be provided.
In addition, a fusion center
concept is increasingly needed
because as PPTAK knows in its report,
it states that the disclosure of CBCC
violation actions, one of which is
helped by re-checking the system.
passenger risk management (PRM)
which is a system by applying the
concept of providing data that can be
used in observing someone who is
suspected of committing certain
violations. This PRM for Customs
agencies is very vital in analyzing the
movement of people in and out of
the Indonesian border. So that this
PRM can be the basis of the concept
of a fusion center system that
combines other data from other
institutions.
Based on the intelligence
process in the context of previous
CBCC surveillance, at least three main
agencies and several other relevant
agencies were found that needed
synergy in supervising and cracking
down on any CBCC violations.
Therefore, an appropriate mechanism
is needed in the development of a
fusion center so that it
accommodates all parties who need
intelligence data to carry out their
duties and functions.
Before describing the concept
of data exchange between agencies
that can be used, here are some
institutions or bodies that may be
related to CBCC practices or TPPU
practices. Based on the 2021 TPPU
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risk assessment team report, there
are at least nine supervisory or
regulatory institutions involved, such
as the Financial Services Authority,
Bank Indonesia, the Ministry of
Cooperatives and Small and Medium
Enterprises, Commodity Futures
Trading Supervisory Agency,
Directorate General of State Assets,
Ministry of Finance, Directorate
General of General Legal
Administration, Ministry of Law and
Human Rights, Ministry of Agrarian
and Spatial Planning, National Land
Agency, Center for Financial
Professional Development, Ministry
of Finance, and Center for Transaction
Reporting and Analysis Finance. In
addition, there are eight law
enforcement agencies, namely the
National Police of the Republic of
Indonesia, the Attorney General's
Office of the Republic of Indonesia,
the Corruption Eradication
Commission (KPK), the National
Narcotics Agency (BNN), the
Directorate General of Customs and
Excise, the Directorate General of
Taxes, Civil Service Investigator
(PPNS) and Judge.
Of the many agencies, for this
case of CBCC supervision, in simple
terms the fusion center
arrangements obtained can be
designed as follows:
Figure 2. Simple Concept of CBCC Practice Integrated Surveillance Fusion Center
3. Narrowing the cash courier cross-
border space with regulatory
changes & strengthenings.
In addition to surveillance
efforts or actions by strengthening
aspects of strategic intelligence,
strengthening and changing
regulations through legislation is also
necessary for better prevention of
CBCC violations. This is an effort that
needs to be done because in general
perpetrators take advantage of
Layer/Layer 2 CBCC
Oversight
FUSION
CENTER
DJBC
PPATK
PRM
WOULD
BNN
.BIN
BNPT
Other
Institution
s/Agencies/
Ministries
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loopholes in regulations that make
their actions in a "gray" position in
the eyes law. In various countries,
efforts are made by tightening rules
related to cash, including in
Indonesia. Citing research from Ayu
(2018) In terms of law enforcement, in
order to prevent money laundering, if
no one reports, PPATK and Customs
have the authority to refuse the
carrying of Rp 100,000,000.00 as well
as Bank Indonesia does not allow the
carrying of cash.
Furthermore, in every
violation, the responsibility for cash-
bearers who violate reporting
obligations should provide a 10% fine
with a maximum limit of IDR
300,000,000.00 as compliance with
the prohibition on violators and avoid
confusion in the implementation of
the provisions for carrying cash so
that the means are very effective
against the provisions of the carrying
obligation Cash.
In addition, from efforts to change
regulations, the Ministry of Finance issued
a Regulation of the Minister of Finance
concerning Amendments to the Minister of
Finance Regulation Number 157 / PMK.04 /
2017 concerning procedures for
notification and supervision, suspicious
indicators, carrying cash money and/or
other payment instruments, as well as the
imposition of sanksi administrative and
solicitation to the state treasury to reduce
loopholes in previous regulations that
CBCC criminals could exploit. The changes
to the regulations contained in PMK
Number 100 / PMK.04 / 2018 are aimed at
achieving and maintaining the stability of
the rupiah value through monetary control
over the traffic carrying foreign banknotes
into and out of the Indonesian customs
area. This is also based on the amendment
of Bank Indonesia Regulation Number
19/7/PBI/ 2017 concerning the Carrying of
Foreign Banknotes into and out of the
Indonesian Customs Area as amended by
Bank Indonesia Regulation Number 20/ 2/
PBI/ 2018 concerning Amendments to Bank
Indonesia Regulation Number 19/7/PBI/
2017 concerning the Carrying of Foreign
Banknotes into and out of the Indonesian
Customs Area
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the results of the previous
data analysis, it can be concluded that the
supervision and countermeasures of CBCC
activities obtained the following
conclusions. First, the CBCC threat certainly
cannot be regarded as a simple threat
which is interpreted as an act of carrying
money into Indonesia beyond the limit or
the amount set. Furthermore, the practice
of CBCC violations has a threat with more
complex risks, namely in addition to
impacting the economic aspects of CBCC
violations are strongly related to the threat
of other transnational crimes such as
narcotics trafficking and terrorism
financing. Perpetrators of narcotics
trafficking generally use the CBCC violation
method or carry out cash smuggling to
launder their money outside their territory
of circulating narcotics. Meanwhile,
perpetrators of acts of terrorism like this
method because of the difficulty of the
relevant authorities in tracing the flow of
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funds. So that CBCC violations or cash
smuggling are the main threats to
Indonesia's customs and economic system
which risks disrupting Indonesia's national
security and resilience.
Secondly viewed from a customs and
strategic intelligence standpoint,
surveillance of CBCC practices requires a
wealth of data from multiple points of view
to provide a more comprehensive mapping
of the problem. In addition, appropriate
intelligence data exchange media is
needed so as to enable every surveillance
agency, especially the DGCA, to have easy
access to any data needed for surveillance
and enforcement. Not to forget from the
point of view of law enforcement,
regulatory improvements and
strengthening the legal basis continue to
be sought to support the effectiveness of
enforcement in the field and narrow the
movement or mode that can be used by
perpetrators or cash couriers.
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© 2023 by the authors. Submitted
for possible open access publication
under the terms and conditions of the Creative
Commons Attribution (CC BY SA) license
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/).