JRSSEM 2023, Vol. 02, No. 6, 1008 1021
E-ISSN: 2807 - 6311, P-ISSN: 2807 - 6494
DOI: 10.36418/jrssem.v2i06.360 https://jrssem.publikasiindonesia.id/index.php/jrssem
EFFECT OF DIRECTORS' BONUS COMPENSATION,
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SIZE OF THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS ON PROFIT MANAGEMENT
Wike Handayani
1
Agustin Fadjarenie
2
1,2
University of Mercu Buana, Indonesia
*
e-mail: wike.handayani@gmail.com, agustin.fadjarenie@mercubuana.ac.id
*Correspondence: wike.handayani@gmail.com
Submitted
: 27
th
December 2022
Revised
: 14
th
January 2023
Accepted
: 24
th
January 2023
Abstract: The current business development is very fast, which encourages organizations to be able
to continue to present reliable and accountable financial information for their users. Reliable
financial information is very necessary for decision-makers, especially stakeholders and potential
investors, especially to make investments. Unqualified and reliable financial statements produce
Earning Management and Financial Fraud Reporting. Research design is a blueprint, that is, a
design for collecting, measuring, and analyzing data, which is designed to answer the formulation
of problems. This study used a descriptive research design. This research is research with a
quantitative approach. The purpose of this study is to analyze the influence between exogenous
variables to endogenous variables, so this study is a type of Causal research. The type of
quantitative research in this study is causal studies, which is a type of research based on the concept
of cause. The conclusion of the results of this study is that CEO bonus compensation and the size
of the board of directors have a positive effect on earnings management.
Keywords: Financial Statements; Investment; Earnings Management.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial Statements according to
PSAK No. 1 (2015): "Financial statements
are a structured presentation of the
financial position and financial
performance of an entity". This report
displays financial information as a form of
communication of an entity in a given
period quantified in monetary value to
interested parties with the information
(Weygandt et al., 2014). Financial
information that is reliable is free from
misleading notions, and material errors,
and can be relied upon by its users as a
faithful representation. The current
business development is very fast, which
encourages organizations to be able to
continue to present reliable and
accountable financial information to their
users. Reliable financial information is very
necessary for decision-makers, especially
stakeholders and potential investors,
especially to make investments. The
decision to invest will determine the
amount of a country's economic growth.
State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) as
actors of economic activities in the national
economy based on economic democracy.
SOEs have an important role in the
implementation of the national economy
(GDP) in order to realize the welfare of the
community. The role of State-Owned
Enterprises in the national economy to
realize community welfare has not been
optimal. Optimizing the role of State-
Owned Enterprises, their management and
supervision must be carried out
professionally (Law No. 19 of 2003
concerning SOEs). This is marked by the
lack of quality of financial statements.
Penny (2013) stated that improving the
quality of financial statements is very
important because financial statements are
very necessary and useful for many parties,
namely internal parties (management and
board of directors) and also external parties
(investors, creditors, and the government).
The government expects and designs
SOEs to become the locomotive of the
Indonesian economy. Economic actors such
as SOEs, cooperatives, and the private
sector must increase productivity, quality,
and efficiency so that Indonesia excels in
competing in the global market. The
government consideredit was necessary to
encourage various State-Owned
Enterprises (BUMN) in order to create a
competitive advantage strategy in each of
their business fields to be ready to face the
Asean Economic Community (AEC) starting
in 2015 (Sjamsul Arifin, 2011). The greater
role of SOEs needs to be encouraged to
revive the concept of Indonesia
Incorporated, which is an effort to raise
state-owned companies and their private
partners to boost the country's economy
(Aviliani et al., 2014).
The reality on the ground shows that
the performance in SOEs is not optimal due
to the low profit margin or profit due to
product competitiveness, service level and
marketing handling (Djalil, 2015). The low-
profit margin or profit of SOEs is shown in
table 1. as follows:
1010 | Effect of Directors' Bonus Compensation, Institutional Ownership And Size of The Board
of Directors on Profit Management
Table 1.
Financial Performance of SOEs in 2017-
2020
Year
Numbe
of SOEs
Assets
Equity
Profit
2020
107
9.246,29
2.590,1
42,58
2019
113
8.715,69
2.647,06
161,29
2018
114
8.201,97
2.819,16
190,49
2017
115
7.306,04
2.464,08
188,39
Sumber: bps.go.id (triliun rupiah)
Figure 1.
Asset and Equity Comparison Chart
Against Profit
Source: bps.go.id (trillion rupiah)
However, even so, the performance
of SOEs still cannot be said to be optimal.
This is evidenced by the many cases
involving the lack of quality of the Financial
Statements produced. Unqualified
Financial Statements produced will mislead
investors so that they have the potential to
reduce investment interest. Furthermore, it
will slow down economic growth.
Many cases show the lack of quality
of financial statements that arise, for
example, cases of financial statement
manipulation carried out by Jiwasraya,
Garuda Indonesia, Enron, World Com and
so on. Unqualified and reliable financial
statements produce Earning Management
and Financial Fraud Reporting.
The case that occurred in 2019 that
shocked the whole of Indonesia. This case
occurs in large state-owned companies
that practice profit management by
utilizing accounting policies regarding
revenue recognition. According to the OJK
from the www.ojk.go.id website and the
Ministry of Finance from the
www.djkn.kekemenkeu.go.id website in
April 2019 PT. Garuda Indonesia stated that
it has carried out profit management by
utilizing the selection of accounting
policies. This case was known by two
commissioners, namely Chairul Tanjung
and Doni Oskaria who are shareholders of
28.08% of PT. Garuda Indonesia. They
refused to sign PT. PT's 2018 annual report.
Garuda Indonesia. Both of them disagree
with the revenue recognition of one of the
transactions with the PT. Mahata Aero
Teknologi with its subsidiary, Citilink
Indonesia. From the transaction, PT. Garuda
Indonesia earned US$239,940,000. It's just
that, PT. Garuda Indonesia has not received
any payment from PT. Garuda Indonesia.
Mahata Aero Technology. However, it has
been recorded by PT. Garuda Indonesia as
the company's revenue so that in
accounting PT. Garuda Indonesia earned a
net profit of Rp. 11.33 billion from the
previous loss. According to the OJK and the
Ministry of Finance on the annual report of
PT. Garuda Indonesia Persero Tbk. for the
2018 period is not in accordance with
Article 69 of Law Number 8 of 1995 Capital
Market (PM Law) and Bapepam and LK
regulations Number VIII.G.7 concerning the
Presentation and Disclosure of Financial
Statements of Issuers and Public
Companies, Interpretation of Financial
Accounting Standards (ISAK) 8 contains
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Determination of Whether an Agreement
Contains Leases, and Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards (PSAK) 30
concerning Rents. For this reason, PT
Garuda Indonesia Tbk. was ordered to
correct and re-present PT Garuda
Indonesia's LKT as of December 31, 2018
and conduct a public expose no later than
14 days after the sanctions letter was
determined. PT. Garuda Indonesia Tbk. PT.
Garuda Indonesia Tbk is also subject to
administrative sanctions, namely a fine of
Rp. 100,000,000 for violations of OJK
regulation Number 29 / POJK.04 / 2016
containing the Annual Report of Issuers or
Public Companies. Fines are also given to
all members of the board of directors of PT
Garuda Indonesia Tbk. namely
administrative sanctions of fines of Rp.
100,000,000 each for violations of Bapepam
Regulation Number VIII.G.11 concerning
the Responsibility of the Board of Directors
for Financial Statements. A fine of Rp.
100,000,000 is also imposed on the board
of directors and board of commissioners of
PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk. who signed the
Annual Report of PT Garuda Indonesia Tbk.
in 2018 for violating OJK Regulation
Number 29/POJK.04/2016 concerning the
Annual Report of the Issuer or Public
Company. According to Chairul Tanjung
and Doni Oskaria, PT. Garuda Indonesia
should still record losses if the transaction
with PT. Mahata Aero Teknologi is not
recognized as revenue by PT. Garuda
Indonesia. It can be concluded that PT.
Garuda Indonesia conducts profit
management practices where it has
recognized revenues that have not actually
been received. According to the OJK and
the Ministry of Finance carried out by the
management of PT. Garuda Indonesia is a
legal matter where the management of PT.
Garuda Indonesia conducts profit
management practices by acknowledging
its opinions at once in one period in
accordance with PSAK 30 on leases, in
which PT. Garuda Indonesia has carried out
profit management using the Income
Maximization pattern by utilizing
accounting policies that do not violate
regulations.
Unqualified and reliable financial
statements produce Earning Management
and Financial Fraud Reporting. A frequent
phenomenon of top executives in America,
announced by FOX in 1980, reporting that
ninety percent of companies in America use
bonus packages based on accounting
earnings to reward managers. The case
postulates that stakeholders are rewarded
by a bonus scheme with an accounting
selection procedure to maximize the bonus
compensation they get and the positions
they stake.
Compensation is a reward both
financially and non-financially (financial
reward) given to employees for achieving
performance to the company (Mujanah,
2019). Compensation is classified into 2
(two) types, namely cash and non-cash or
commonly known as long-term
compensation ((Assenso-Okofo et al.,
2021). According to Edwin B. Flippo (2007)
in his book Personnel Management
(translation), which states that
"Compensation is the equitable
remuneration of personal for their
contribution to organization objectives".
The compensation provided can be direct
compensation such as wages and salaries,
bonuses, incentives, and benefit or non-
1012 | Effect of Directors' Bonus Compensation, Institutional Ownership And Size of The Board
of Directors on Profit Management
financial programs (indirect compensation).
Compensation of directors is an important
part of building a company. The Directors
of SOEs are agents for the State because
the State is the owner of the company. Each
BUMN has its own guidelines for the
calculation of compensation that will be
given to the directors of SOEs, including the
calculation of salaries, facilities, retirement
compensation, and tantiem (bonuses)
whose calculations are mostly based on
measures of financial performance,
especially company profits. The guidelines
are regulated in the Regulation of the
Minister of SOEs Number: PER-04 / MBU /
2014 which is amended by PER-01 / MBU /
06/2016, PER-01 / MBU / 06/2017 and PER-
06 / MBU / 06/2018 concerning guidelines
for determining the income of directors,
board of commissioners and supervisory
boards of state-owned enterprises.
Tantiem (bonus) is the most interesting
thing to observe, because bonuses are
given to companies if the Board of
Directors is able to book a profit. The
calculation of bonuses in SOEs is not only
based on profit but also based on last
year's performance and the performance of
the relevant year and budget targets. The
existence of bonus compensation in the
company will provide motivation to agents
to manipulate profits in order to obtain
maximum profit so that compensation in
the form of bonuses can be achieved
beyond the target. Management can carry
out profit management actions through
discretionary accruals so that the
compensation they receive will be greater.
The phenomenon of profit management in
SOEs on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX), among others, is shown by the case
of PT. Kimia Farma (Persero) Tbk, and PT.
Indofarma (Persero) Tbk. This profit
management action is indicated by the
existence of a profit management motive
to obtain a good assessment of the
achievement of the company's financial
performance (Nuryaman, 2010). According
to Suryatiningsih (2008) stated that the SOE
directors' bonus scheme provides
incentives for directors to carry out profit
management through discretionary
accruals that increase profits in order to
maximize the bonuses they receive. This is
because the amount of the bonus depends
on the amount of profit obtained, the high
profit obtained by the company will affect
the bonus obtained. In line with research
from Panjaitan & Muslih (2019) and Almadi
& Lazic (2016). Executive bonus
compensation is the main motivation for
executives to engage in income
manipulation (Alkebsee et al., 2021);
(Conyon & He, 2017); and (Kim et al., 2013).
This suggests that paying non-equity
compensation to executives is negatively
related to Real Earning Management.
Support from the community that
affects the survival of the company. This
support is reflected in customers who are
loyal to the company, and employees who
work optimally for the benefit of the
company so as to improve financial
performance (Kim et al, 2014). Managers
who manipulate profits for their personal
interests will lower the level of trust of
stakeholders because the company is
considered to be endangering the interests
of its stakeholders. Research by Uwuigbe et
al. (2014) and Kamran and Shah (2014)
stated that GCG mechanisms have a
significant effect on profit management.
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The effectiveness of the supervisory
function by the board of commissioners
requires high independence. Contrary to
the above study, the research of Cohen et
al., (2017) states that GCG affects the
quality of financial reporting. Some good
corporate governance mechanisms include
the existence of a board of directors, an
independent board of commissioners, and
an audit committee. The board of directors
is a management system that is responsible
for the implementation of Good corporate
governance to achieve company goals. The
results of Ardiansyah's research (2014)
show that the board of directors negatively
affects profit management.
In the research Putri & Fadhlia (2017)
states that executive compensation does
not affect profit management practices.
Whereas in Park's research (2019) executive
compensation affects the existence of
profit management practices, the same
results revealed in Elfira's research (2014)
stated that directors' compensation affects
profit management significantly.
Institutional ownership is the ownership of
company shares owned by an institution or
institution (Tarjo, 2008). Managers who
hold shares of the company will be
reviewed by parties involved in the contract
such as the selection of an audit committee
that creates a request for quality financial
reporting by shareholders, creditors, and
users of financial statements to ensure the
efficiency of the contracts concluded in.
Thus, management will be motivated to
prepare quality financial statements. This
would reflect better contract conditions
(Ball et al., 2000). Therefore, it is likely that
the level of managerial ownership will be in
the same direction to suppress the
utilization of discretionary accruals (profit
management) by the management side. In
the research of (Mahiswari, 2016) stated
that good corporate governance proxied
by institutional ownership has a significant
effect on reducing profit management
practices. In the research of (Mahiswari,
2016) good corporate governance proxied
by independent commissioners has no
significant effect on profit management.
However, in the research of Nurlan Orazalin
(2019), Aprajita Pandey and J.K. Pattanayak
(2021), Deepa (Mangala & Singla, 2021),
Shafi Mohamad et al. (2020), and (Grada,
2022) stated that the supervision of an
independent board of commissioners had
a significant effect on reducing the
occurrence of profit management. Shuto
(2008) examined the relationship between
discretionary accounting choices and
executive compensation in companies in
Japan. The results of the study illustrate the
use of discretionary accruals will increase
the compensation received by executives in
Japan. However, research that looks at the
effect of accrual with compensation for SOE
directors in Indonesia is still very rarely
carried out so that there is still a similar
research gap in Indonesia. The bonus plan
hypothesis states that a bonus plan or
managerial compensation would make
managers more likely to choose and use
accounting methods that would make
reported profits higher (Watts and
Zimmermann, 1986). In companies that
have a bonus plan, company managers will
prefer an accounting method that can shift
profits from the future to the present so as
to increase current profits. This is because
managers prefer to provide higher wages
for the present.
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DOI: 10.36418/jrssem.v2i06.360 https://jrssem.publikasiindonesia.id/index.php/jrssem
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Research design is a blueprint, which
is a design to collect, measure and analyze
data, which is designed to answer problem
formulations (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016).
This research is designed as applied
research and not basic research (Sekaran &
Bougie, 2016). This type of research is a
type of survey study, to distinguish it from
experimental studies (Cooper & Schindler,
2014).
This study used a descriptive research
design. Sekaran and Bougie (2016) state
that descriptive research is research
designed to collect data that describes the
character traits of a particular person,
event, or situation.
This research is a research with a
quantitative approach also used to test a
certain theory by examining the
relationship between variables where these
variables are measured using research
instruments so that data in the form of
numbers are obtained (Cresswell, 2018).
The purpose of this study is to
analyze the influence between exogenous
variables to endogenous variables, so this
study is a type of Causal research. The type
of quantitative research in this study is
causal studies, which is a type of research
based on the concept of cause. More
specifically, the causal study in this study is
asymmetrical (asymmetrical relationship),
which means a causal type of research
whose influence is only one direction,
namely the influence of independent
variables on dependent variables, which
means that the direction of the arrow is
only one direction, namely from
independent variables to dependent
variables. This means that changes to a
variable (independent variable) have an
impact on changes in another variable
(dependent variable) (Cooper and
Schindler, 2014). This study examined the
influence of three variables, consisting of
two independent variables, namely CEO
Bonus Compensation (X1), Institutional
Ownership (X2), and Board of Directors Size
(X3) and one dependent variable, namely
Earning Management (Y).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Overview of Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX)
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) is a
stock exchange operating in Indonesia. The
Indonesia Stock Exchange is the result of
the merger of the Jakarta Stock Exchange
(JSX) with the Surabaya Stock Exchange
(BES). For the sake of operational and
transaction effectiveness, the Government
decided to merge the Jakarta Stock
Exchange as a stock market with the
Surabaya Stock Exchange as a bond and
derivatives market into the IDX. The
merged exchange began operations on
December 1, 2007. IDX uses a trading
system called Jakarta Automated Trading
System (JATS) since May 22, 1995, replacing
the manual system used previously. Since
March 2, 2009, the JATS system itself has
been replaced with a new system called
JATS-NextG.
At the beginning of the 19th century,
Indonesia was known as the Dutch East
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Indies or the Back Indies. Since the new era
of the Dutch East Indies government, they
began to build plantations on a large scale
in the Dutch East Indies. The source of
funds in building the plantation was
obtained from the dutch and other
Europeans. Stock transactions in securities
trading were first recorded in 1892, which
was carried out by the Plantation Company
in Batavia, namely Cultuur Maatschappij
Goalpara, it was written that the company
sold 400 shares at a price of 500 guilders
per share outstanding. Four years later, Het
Centrum also released a prospectus for the
sale of shares that had a value of up to 105
thousand guilders with a price per share of
100 guilders. After making careful
preparations, the first capital market in
Indonesia was finally established precisely
in Batavia (Jakarta) on December 14, 1912,
called Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel
or stock exchange and immediately started
its trading activities. The shares traded are
shares or bonds of Dutch
companies/plantations operating in
Indonesia where bonds issued by the
provincial and municipal governments
have share certificates of companies issued
by administrative offices in the Netherlands
and then securities of other Dutch
companies. The development of the capital
market in Batavia was so rapid that it
attracted other urban people.
Almost half a century has passed
since the stock exchange was first formed
in Batavia under the name Vereniging voor
de Effectenhandel or Securities Trading
Association. This formation was carried out
after the Dutch East Indies government
implemented a policy of 'Ethical Politics' in
1901. The Dutch East Indies government
believes that with this association, the
development process can run well. The
majority of investors come from Dutch and
European people who have above-average
incomes. However, the outbreak of World
War I brought stock trading activities to a
halt in 1914-1918.
In 1925 the Stock Exchange was
reopened as well as formed two new stock
exchanges in Indonesia, namely the
Surabaya Stock Exchange and the
Semarang Stock Exchange. Unfortunately,
this exciting news did not last long because
the IDX was faced with an Economic
Recession in 1929 and the outbreak of
World War II. The worsening situation
made the Surabaya and Semarang Stock
Exchanges closed, which was also followed
by the Jakarta Stock Exchange on May 10,
1940.
Trading without a bond is no longer
considered efficient. The number of
certificates that are lost when stored or
there are also many certificates that have
been forged even administratively and their
issuance will hinder the process of
completing transactions. The year 2003 was
entered with optimism. JCI opened at the
beginning of the year on January 1, 2003
with a value of 4,005.44. In 2004 the JCI had
broken through the 1,000 level and at the
end of 2004 on December 30, 2004 the JCI
closed at a value of 1,000.23. In 2005, on
January 3, 2005 the JCI opened at a value
of 1,038.82 points and at the end of the
year on December 29, 2005 the JCI closed
at a value of 1,162.63 points. In 2007 the JCI
broke through a value above 2,000 points
on April 26, 2007 of 2,016,033 and on
October 22, 2007 it had reached a value of
2,446.76. Effective from November 2007
1016 | Effect of Directors' Bonus Compensation, Institutional Ownership And Size of The Board
of Directors on Profit Management
after the Extraordinary General Meeting of
Shareholders held on October 30, 2007, JSE
and BES merged into the Indonesia Stock
Exchange.
On November 30, 2007, the Surabaya
Stock Exchange (BES) and the Jakarta Stock
Exchange (JSX) were finally merged and
changed their names to the Indonesia
Stock Exchange (IDX). After the birth of the
IDX, the trading suspension was imposed in
2008 and the Indonesian Securities Price
Appraiser (PHEI) was formed in 2009. In
addition, in 2009, the Indonesia Stock
Exchange changed the old trading system
(JATS) and launched its newest trading
system used by the IDX until now, namely
JATS-NextG. Several other bodies were also
established to increase trading activities,
such as the establishment of PT Indonesian
Capital Market Electronic Library (ICaMEL)
in August 2011. The Financial Services
Authority (OJK) in January 2012, and at the
end of 2012, the Securities Investor
Protection Fund (SIPF), and Sharia
Principles and Sharia Trading Mechanisms
were also launched. IDX also made several
updates, on January 2, 2013 the trading
hours were updated, and in the following
year the Lot Size and Tick Price were
adjusted again, and in 2015 TICMI merged
with ICaMEL.
The Indonesia Stock Exchange also
created a campaign called "Yuk Nabung
Saham" which is aimed at all Indonesians to
want to start investing in the capital market.
IDX introduced the campaign for the first
time on November 12, 2015, and this
campaign is still being implemented today,
and in the same year LQ-45 Index Futures
was inaugurated. In 2016, the Tick Size and
Autorejection limits were adjusted again,
IDX Channel was launched, and IDX this
year participated in the success of Tax
Amnesty activities and inaugurated the Go
Public Information Center. In 2017, IDX
Incubator was inaugurated, margin
relaxation, and the inauguration of the
Indonesia Securities Fund. In 2018, the
Trading System and New Data Center have
been updated, launching Transaction
Settlement T + 2 (T + 2 Settlement) and
Adding Special Notation Information
Display to the Registered Company code.
The Indonesia Stock Exchange also
has a vision and mission to achieve the
company's goals. The vision of the
Indonesia Stock Exchange is to become a
competitive exchange with world-level
credibility, with the mission of providing
infrastructure to support the
implementation of securities trading that is
orderly, reasonable, and efficient and easily
accessible to all stakeholders. In 2012, the
establishment of the Financial Services
Authority (OJK) which functions so that all
activities in the capital market sector:
1. Held regularly, fairly, transparently, and
accountably,
2. Able to realize a financial system that
grows sustainably and stably, and
3. Able to protect the interests of
consumers and society. Then, in 2016
the IDX participated in the success of Tax
Amnesty activities and the inauguration
of the Go Public Information Center
(Indonesia Stock Exchange, 2019).
BUMN
State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN) are
types of companies with capital mostly or
entirely state-owned. SOEs are engaged in
various industrial sectors with the aim of
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creating common prosperity. There are
several state-owned companies also
available on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX). The main function of the
establishment of SOEs is to create
community benefits. Here's the
explanation.
1. Providing products in the form of goods
or services for the people of Indonesia.
2. Become one among the various media
for the government to decide on policies
in the economic field.
3. Create jobs.
4. Become a source of income or foreign
exchange of the country.
5. Become a medium for the development
of small businesses, including SMEs and
cooperatives.
6. Be simultaneous or encourage the
creation of new business opportunities.
7. Managing state-owned natural
resources.
8. To be a pioneer of development that has
not been touched by the private sector.
As a state-owned enterprise, SOEs
have characteristics that distinguish them
from private companies. Here's the
explanation.
1. Source of State Revenue
2. Fully Controlled by the Government
3. Risks Fully Borne by the Government
4. Serving the Public and Public Interest
5. People Can Also Own Shares
6. Providing for the Needs of the People
SOEs have an obligation to provide
goods and/or services that are the basic
needs of the community. In simple terms, if
these goods and/or services are not
provided by the government, the people
will be very difficult.
Board of Directors Bonus Compensation
affects Earning Management
Based on the results of hypothesis
testing, it shows that the Board of Directors'
Bonus Compensation has a positive effect
on Earning Management. The results of this
study support previous empirical findings
by (Basuroy et al., 2014) and Okofo et al.
(2021) who found that Board of Directors
Bonus Compensation affects Earning
Management. This means that companies
that have high directors' bonus
compensation have a tendency to do
Earning Management.
Compensation can positively affect
profit management. The company's
compensation system has a positive impact
on strategic performance. These results are
reinforced by endogenous profit
management using instrumental variables.
The relationship between management
earnings and compensation for ownership
is stronger for companies with better
governance and higher institutional
ownership and for CEOs with larger career
issues.
Therefore, it can be concluded that
the existence of agency theory can be
proven in explaining the relationship
between CEO compensation and profit
management. Agency theory explains that
principals and agents have differences in
interests, where the agent wants to
maximize his welfare and the principal has
one of the wishes that the agent does not
perform information asymmetry. To
overcome these differences in interests, the
way the principal does is to compensate
bonuses. Therefore, it can be concluded
that the greater the compensation received
1018 | Effect of Directors' Bonus Compensation, Institutional Ownership And Size of The Board
of Directors on Profit Management
by the CEO, the greater the opportunity to
do profit management.
Institutional Ownership effects Earning
Management
Based on the results of hypothesis
testing, it shows that Institutional
Ownership has a positive effect on Earning
Management. The results of this study
support previous empirical findings by Rizki
& Kesuma (2019) who found that
Institutional Ownership affects Earning
Management. This research resulted in a
finding that the higher the institutional
ownership will affect the occurrence of
profit management because the high level
of institutional ownership can intervene in
the process of preparing financial
statements carried out by managers to be
able to present satisfactory reports.
Agency theory also assumes the
existence of information asymmetry, which
is a situation where agents / managers who
manage the company have more access to
internal company information that is not
owned by outside the company (Indra,
2011). This is in line with the stated by
(Midiastuty, 2016) who stated that agency
theory uses three assumptions of human
nature, namely in general humans tend to
attach importance to themselves (self-
interest), humans have limited thinking
power about future perceptions (bounded
rationality) and humans tend to avoid risk
(risk averse). Therefore, the higher the level
of institutional shareholding, the higher the
profit management practice in financial
statements
The size of the Board of Directors affects
Earning Management
Based on the results of hypothesis
testing, it shows that the Board of Directors
has a positive effect on Earning
Management. The results of this study
support previous empirical findings by
Kapoor & Goel (2017), (Buertey et al., 2020),
Triki Damak (2018) and Abdullah & Ismail
(2016) who found that the board of
directors had a positive effect on Earning
Management. The results of the t statistical
test in this study resulted in the board of
directors variables individually affecting the
Earning Management variable. This means
that companies that have a high influential
board of directors have a tendency to do
Earning Management.
The large size of the board of
directors will have a tendency to
manipulate profits in the company's
financial reporting. The board of directors
has responsibility for the running of the
company's management which is expected
to be able to improve financial
performance for the better. The board of
directors is also in charge of creating and
regulating good corporate governance
mechanisms. In practice, the board of
directors practices manipulating profits to
put their personal interests first. This is
because the board of directors can
influence the discussion and decision-
making process within the company.
Therefore, the higher the size of the board
of directors, the more it will affect profit
management
Wike Handayani
1
Agustin Fadjarenie
2
| 1019
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the phenomenon, problem
formulation, hypothesis and research
results conducted on state-owned
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock
Exchange for the 2017-2020 period, it can
be concluded that, 1) CEO Bonus
Compensation has a positive effect on
Earning Management. This means that
companies that have high CEO bonus
compensation will have an influence on
Earning Management. 2) Institutional
leadership has a positive effect on Earning
Management. This means that high
international ownership will have an
influence on Earning Management. 3) The
size of the Board of Directors has a positive
effect on Earning Management. This means
that a company that has a high board of
directors size will have an influence on
Earning Management.
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